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A growing debate around the active role played by the neoliberal ideology and the economy con-
nected with it in the crisis development. The polarisation of researchers in this area is quite signifi-
cant: starting from the negation of this role to its complete affirmation. This analysis is aimed at 
contributing to the aforementioned debate, putting forward the following hypothesis: historical 
development of mainstream economics and its influence, to a considerable extent, determined 
the outbreak of the large-scale crisis. In the analytic part, I look into some aspects of economic 
methodology, both orthodox and heterodox, taking my own position on the basis of important 
literature. Criticism of the traditional paradigm and a review of innovative trends in research do 
not show a straightforward road, however, which imposes a moderately optimistic outlook on the 
future, especially as regards the application value of the theory of economy.   
Introduction
The literature is dominated by the opinion that econ-
omy does not develop evenly, going through periods 
of stagnation or even a crisis, and on other occasions, 
quite  the  opposite  -  through  periods  of  accelerated 
development. At the same time, it would be difficult 
to prove that economic progress and changes in eco-
nomic dynamics are synchronized. The situation is all 
the more complex due to the fact that even in periods 
of extending the scope and method of economy (its 
evolution towards heterodoxy), it is subject to attacks, 
which, however, are not always professional. This is 
what is happening now, when the world is rising from 
the global economic breakdown and connections be-
tween the economic theory and the development of 
events are assessed in a thorough and strict manner. 
Apart  from  emotional  and  strongly  ideological  ap-
proaches, there are also the ones based on a sound, 
scientific base. In an attempt to order them, these ap-
proaches can be defined as technical and economic, 
nihilistic and historical.
The first of these actually disregards the influence 
of economic sciences on the onset and development of 
the crisis in the USA and, subsequently, in the world. 
Representatives  of  this  approach  (e.g.  Taylor,  2009; 
Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan & Laeven, 2010; Laeven 
&  Valencia,  2010)  think  that  technical  phenomena 
played the decisive role among the causes of the crisis: 
expansive monetary policy, globalization of financial 
markets, unprecedented debt constituting the source 
of mortgage funding and their securitisation. Actually, 
the exposure of certain psychological traits of Inves-
tors - greed, underestimation of risk or herd behaviour, 
constitutes the only exception in this approach, as the 
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psychological aspects are accounted for by the theory 
of  behavioural  finance  (Szyszka,  2009).  All  doubts 
about the dispute about the role of the theory are dis-
pelled by Rosati (2009, p. 316) who states: “...I reject 
political and propaganda opinions according to which 
the crisis is mostly caused by excessive presence of the 
state in the economy or the lack of it... In particular 
I am trying to show that the present crisis is primarily 
caused by incompatibility of regulation and supervi-
sion systems and risk assessment methods...”
The nihilist approach to the relations between the 
theory of economy and the dynamics of economy con-
sists in the assumption that although the paths of the 
development of science and practice sometimes cross, 
such coincidence occurs rarely, which is why it is not 
worth trying to find out to what extent the evolution of 
the economy contributed to the global crisis (Wojtyna, 
2008, p. 9). Fiedor (2010, p. 454) expresses his opinion 
more bluntly when he states: “...economy is not “be-
fore” or “after” the crisis, but during its normal process 
of development..., it is “late” as regards the extent to 
which  important economic, technological, civilization 
and cultural processes and trends have been recog-
nized in theory and addressed in the economic policy.” 
Hence, the conclusion that since the influence of eco-
nomics on the economic reality and its predictive abil-
ity are small, studies in this field and their influence on 
the economic cycles are not justified. 
The historical approach to the relations between the 
economy and the development of events, on the other 
hand, is based on the conviction that the causes of the 
contemporary crisis are much more deep-rooted and 
they are not only limited to technical ones (Krugman, 
2007; Colander et al., 2009; Żyżyński, 2009; Kołodko, 
2010). Representatives of this approach argue that the 
actual cause of the crisis should be looked for in struc-
tural changes, which occurred in the global economy 
over the past few decades and have their bases in the 
mainstream economics.
The  technical-economic  and  nihilist  approaches 
raise doubts, although each of them does so for other 
reasons.  As far as the former approach is concerned, 
it is difficult not to agree with the claim that excessive 
expansion of mortgage loans, underestimation of risk, 
and rapid development of financial engineering was 
a significant impulse for the economic crisis in the 
USA. In a broader geographical context, on the other 
hand, is the extension of the channels for free and al-
most immediate capital, which promoted the conta-
gion effect. Even the most in-depth analysis of these 
causes of the crisis does not make it possible to answer 
the question why the intensification of the aforemen-
tioned  phenomena  occurred  at  a  certain  period  of 
time and with sufficient strength to cause an abrupt 
economic breakdown on an unprecedented scale. It 
is also worth giving some thought to the greed com-
monly arising among investors and managers, which 
constituted the main driving force behind their actions 
(especially in the USA), dispelling doubts around the 
reasons for the carefreeness of the regulators supervis-
ing financial markets. Representatives of the technical 
and economic approach avoid this kind of reflection 
by definition, which makes their diagnoses and rec-
ommendations shallow and they do not guarantee the 
prevention of crisis occurrence in the future. 
The  nihilist  approach  can  be  understood,  among 
other  things,  as  an  attempt  to  defend  the  economy 
against the attacks of the proponents of the so-called 
alternative  economics  or,  in  other  words,  “anti-eco-
nomics” (Coyle, 2007), who blame the economics (es-
pecially mainstream economics) for causing the global 
breakdown by undermining its scientific value. This 
attempt can be understood in as much as quite a few 
(if not, the majority) of the antagonists who use para-
scientific arguments, pushing their conclusions to the 
verge of absurdity (e.g. capitalism has ultimately ex-
hausted its economic possibilities). However, the nihil-
ist approach still gives rise to a discussion: for example, 
it is not known exactly what the “normal” process of 
scientific development” or “being late” in the area of 
accounting for reality mean (is it about the future or 
perhaps about the past?). A more serious objection 
concerns the suggestion that the paths of economic 
development and practice often stay out of touch with 
each other, which can be interpreted as the limited 
strength of the influence of the science and economic 
principles on the reality. And this stands in open con-
tradiction to historical facts: it is enough to recall the 
Keynesian revolution, which did away with the classi-
cal Say’s Law of marketing, creating the basis for mod-
ern state intervention over a few decades (e.g. Japan, 
France, South Korea). It should also be remembered 
that the neoclassical supply theory was introduced in 
the 1970s, based on the neoliberal ideology, which re-6 W. Jakóbik
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sulted in economic experiments in Great Britain and 
the United States. However, mainstream theories truly 
flourished in their interaction with the third phase of 
globalization (especially in the 1990s and later), giving 
rise to quite new qualitative phenomena. 
1.  Primary  and  secondary  causes  of 
the crisis
The weaknesses of some research approaches presented 
above justify the application of the historical approach, 
the representatives of which analyze the formation of 
fundamental, primary causes of the global breakdown 
from  a  long-term  perspective.  The  fact  that,  in  the 
course of time, they have generated secondary causes, 
which directly initiated the symptoms of the global 
financial and economic crisis, are their characteristic 
features. Therefore, the first step in the research pro-
cedure included the determination of the structure of 
dependencies between these causes (Fig.1).
By adopting intellectual consideration as the prima-
ry cause of all economic events, it should be pointed 
out  that  liberalism  constitutes  the  beginning  of  the 
future disputable, and as it will turn out, thought con-
structs. As it is known, it became part of the Enlighten-
ment thought and it concerned political and economic 
conditions of social life (Hayek, 1982, p. 119). Classi-
cal economics developed on the liberal grounds and it 
created the institutional system enabling free activity 
of entities and at the same time, it made it possible to 
reach the economic and social optimum in the form 
of effective allocation of resources and fair division of 
income. However, in the course of time, liberalism, 
without losing its faith in the market and the freedom 
of the individual, evolved towards an idea of stressing 
the necessity of solving also social issues, which was 
reflected by, among other things, concepts of the  pro-
tective state and social market economy. 
  Neoliberalism  was  not  a  consequence  of  linear 
development of liberalism; the former became a new 
Figure 1. Dependecies between causes of the global crisis
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quality in response to the challenges of the third phase 
of globalization (Harvey, 2005, pp. 19-36). The begin-
nings  of  neoliberalism  should  be  looked  for  in  the 
Mont-Pelerin Society founded by Friedrich von Hayek 
in 1947 (bringing together renowned scholars, such 
as Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and Karl Pop-
per).  The society’s intellectual achievements provided 
the answer to economic problems in the 1970s, i.e. the 
stagflation  and  excessively  developed  welfare  state, 
which  could  no  longer  be  eliminated  by  Keynesian 
economic tools. Monetarism and supply-side econom-
ics were born with the ideas of free-market economy 
and constitutional guarantee of private property, lib-
erty and open society as their basis, while social liber-
alism gave way to market liberalism: since that time, 
work efficiency has become the determinant of income 
(concessions for social transfers were treated as an in-
terference in the economic operation). 
The final victory of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 
the mainstream economics connected with it was so 
convincing that this intellectual construct was granted 
the patent for the only possible and correct interpreta-
tion of the world of economy. In other words, it was 
decided that neoliberalism expressed the natural or-
der of things (cf. the There is No Alternative slogan, 
abbreviated as TNA), which constituted the basis of 
economic policy in developed countries and economic 
programmes  of  international  organisations.  In  the 
American economy of the 1990s, neoliberal ideas were 
additionally enhanced by journalists, big business and 
think-tanks (e.g.  Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute), 
and were also - allegedly - positively verified by rapid 
and  stable  growth  (allegedly,  as  no  cause-and-effect 
dependency between neoliberalism and the develop-
ment of information technology stabilising the growth 
was identified). At that time, few people were capable 
of signalling the embers of crisis.      
The neoliberal ideas were transferred to social and 
economic entities by formal and legal institutions, and 
they were formed, as always in the case of doctrines, 
by political, economic and cultural elites (Morawski, 
2010, p. 90). The establishment of formal institutions 
is difficult as it brings about the necessity of select-
ing  instruments  appropriate  for  their  implementa-
tion. Moreover, the definition of formal objectives is 
troublesome as it is connected with the aggregation of 
interests of the most important groups and selection of 
their representation. The use of common interest is the 
most effective solution in this area (which actually was 
the case in practice). 
It is the task of state authorities to conduct insti-
tutional policy (which is sometimes called systemic), 
within which they determine their functions and role 
in the economy and also establish institutional prin-
ciples of the ongoing operational policy: i.e. monetary, 
fiscal, industrial policy, etc. The ongoing policy can be 
changed on the short- or medium-term basis and it is 
conducted within the currently existing institutional 
framework, imposing the particular rules on all enti-
ties, both domestically and internationally. 
The aforementioned common interest met with a fa-
vourable response in relations between the state and 
corporations, i.e. capital, which is generally regarded 
as the great master of the third phase of globalisation 
(Szymański, 2009). These relations are often treated as 
a game between two entities with a zero sum, in which 
the capital is the winner. Now, we are just a step away 
from concluding that the national state is in retreat and 
the world is controlled by anonymous (market) forces, 
which are supranational in character (Bauman, 2000). 
A suggestion that the state fell prey to the capital is 
hidden behind this thought, while, in reality, in 1990s, 
a symbiosis occurred between the neoliberal vision of 
the establishment with the capital’s natural striving to 
find the So. The state gave way to the capital in a largely 
conscious way, thus intensifying the common sense of 
uncertainty, which was an understandable reaction to 
the  situation  deprived  of  clear  control  mechanisms. 
Insofar as the aforementioned symbiosis served well 
the creation of new formal institutions, it proved disas-
trous for future economic processes. 
 Common interests facilitating the creation of global 
institutions did not occur between states, which was 
caused by several factors. Firstly, it is the state that 
creates institutional (legal) policy through its political 
representation, both domestically and in the interna-
tional arena; this policy is the basis of its operation, 
both in the political and economic systems. Secondly, 
the country is irreplaceable in the role of guarding na-
tional interests as much as it is possible and necessary 
globally (main players are the USA and China) and 
regionally (in the latter case, it is possible to refer to 
the  example  of  difficult  negotiations  during  several 
EU summits).  Thirdly, there is not a single universal 8 W. Jakóbik
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model of regional and global modernisation, the na-
tional state (although its influence is limited) still takes 
care of the historical social and cultural identity, which 
has its place also in the world of economy. Culture, 
which is called global, does not have to be and is not 
Anglo-Saxon culture (or even Western culture) - it is 
rather a hybrid creation assimilating elements of vari-
ous origins. 
In summary, it can be stated that two tendencies, 
which are contradictory and, to some extent, have oc-
curred at the present phase of globalisation: the posi-
tive base of the capital for institutionalisation falling 
within  the  neoliberal  doctrine,  and,  simultaneously, 
conflicts  between  interests  represented  primarily  by 
the  main  players,  which  made  the  institutionalisa-
tion process considerably more difficult. This brought 
about  subsequent  negative  phenomena,  which  were 
connected with each other.  
The first of these was called “systemic provisional 
measure” by Szymański (2009, pp. 30-31) or, in other 
words, incomplete globalisation. It means that a gap 
occurs in world institutions, there are no rules, which 
would regulate the behaviour of the individual coun-
tries as well as individual market participants (includ-
ing corporations, banks, investment funds) in a suffi-
ciently precise manner. Market economy on the global 
level does not have the supreme political authority or 
a set of legal regulations. This is just a step away from 
concluding that the existing provisional measure must 
come down to chaos, contractions, instability and cri-
sis phenomena.
While agreeing with the author on his fundamental 
assessment of the aforementioned phenomena, a few 
critical remarks must be presented. Firstly, the term 
“systemic provisional measure” he used (does it refer 
to  the  institutional  system?)  appears  to  be  too  far-
reaching, especially in view of the existing articulation 
channels and clashes of interest on the international 
level.  Secondly, both terms used by Szymański may 
lead to the false conclusion that it may be possible for 
humanity to arrive at some mature (institutional?) sys-
tem and to ensure complete globalisation by establish-
ing a global government, and, if not a global bank, then 
at  least  global  coordination  of  the  monetary  policy 
(Rybiński, 2007) in the future.  However, this will not 
be successful precisely because in social sciences, a di-
versity of modernity is accepted as well as numerous 
roads leading to it, so it will not be possible to build the 
so-called international community (Eisenstadt, 2001). 
Erroneous deregulation was another phenomenon, 
which contributed to the outbreak of the global crisis, 
especially  in  the  area  of  financial  markets.  The  so-
called first Basel I Capital Accord of 1987, which was 
aimed at forcing banks to limit the loan risk, is a para-
doxical example here (Koronowski, 2009). In reality, 
however, it turns out to be erroneous deregulations as 
a result of a legal loophole in the Accord, American 
banks  developed  off-balance  sheet  transactions,  i.e. 
items  in  derivative  instruments  and  securitisation.   
Owing to the latter, lenders did not bother about loan 
repayment anymore. 
More  spectacular  examples  of  erroneous  deregu-
lation  also  come  from  the  American  economy.  The 
president of the Central Bank (Fed) Greenspan, who 
was  the  proponent  of  far-reaching  freedom  of  fi-
nancial markets, started to seek the abolition of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, which had been passed in 1933 by 
the Congress already held in 1987. This was aimed at 
eliminating pathologies of financial markets revealed 
during  the  Great  Depression.  Finally,  the  act  was 
abolished in 1999. As a result, banks started to grant 
loans to profiteers and consolidation as well as mass 
securitisation of risky loans occurred. Unfortunately, 
these phenomena coincided with lack of supervision 
and control: some segments of the financial market did 
not need to be supervised, e.g. investment banks, rat-
ing agencies and the aforementioned off-balance sheet 
bank transactions primarily in the USA, but also in the 
Old Continent. 
The  beginnings  of  the  difficult  macroeconomic 
situation in the United States date back to the 2001 
recession, when - after the unsuccessful reduction of 
success - the central bank, which is also responsible 
for production and employment, was forced to apply 
a negative real interest rate. This decision did make 
the investment demand of companies more dynamic; 
however, it also caused an increase in the mortgage 
debt of households refinancing it. This situation greatly 
increased the competition between non-bank financial 
institutions  in  the  subprime  market,  which  granted 
high-risk mortgage loans (Sławiński, 2007). The aware-
ness of this fact made these institutions sell loans in the 
secondary market and these liabilities were, in turn, 
bought  by  securitisation  funds  belonging  to  banks. Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
9 Theory of Economy as the Original Cause of the World Crisis
It is important that the loans purchased could be ex-
changed for debt securities, which were then offered 
by these funds to institutional investors.
Trouble  began  when  the  interest  rates  increased, 
making  the  repayment  of  mortgage  debt  more  dif-
ficult  or  sometimes  even  preventing  it.  Finally,  the 
speculative bubble on the real property market burst 
and the real property prices went down quickly as the 
demand for new building investments was limited and 
the supply of houses increased. As (according to some 
estimates) over two-thirds of the increase in produc-
tion and employment were connected with the real 
property market, the slump in this market gave rise to 
a strong tendency to recession in the years 2001-2007. 
At the same time, the growing part of liabilities in the 
subprime market became unpayable, which, in turn, 
caused a crisis of trust in financial products created on 
their basis. In general, this gave an impulse to a lack of 
liquidity in the interbank market, and therefore, also 
an increase in interest rates. At the same time, there 
are a decrease in stock prices and a weakening in the 
dollar. 
In summary, it can be stated that excessive loosen-
ing of the monetary policy at the beginning of the new 
century induced an expansion of lending activity and 
the inflation increasing over time made Fed increase 
its interest rates, which, among other things, resulted 
in the speculative bubble bursting, that had been cre-
ated  earlier  with  the  participation  of  the  Fed  itself. 
Next, a financial crisis breaks out and to stop it, the 
central bank begins to loosen the monetary policy in 
an abrupt way, which is enhanced by government sup-
port packages. 
Another problem the American economy had had 
to deal with for a long period of time was the cur-
rent account deficit, which can be regarded as almost 
a structural part of this economy. The growing cur-
rent account deficit in the balance of payments was 
caused by the increasing deficit in the public sector 
and the regular decrease in the personal savings rate 
(also compared to national investments). It had to be 
covered from the inflow of foreign capital from the so-
called surplus nations: Japan, China, Russia and Arab 
countries. The countries were quite willing to place 
their surplus in the USA in the form of portfolio in-
vestments (in government bonds) and bank deposits. 
The funds acquired from abroad increased the general 
liquidity: the activity of banks in the area of mortgage 
loans extended, which were subsequently liquidated 
by means of securitisation. Thus, it can be seen that 
despite decreasing national savings, the banking sector 
was doing very well not only due to the Fed’s monetary 
expansion,  but  also  due  to  global  imbalance.  Fur-
thermore, some stabilisation of this arrangement did 
not encourage the public authorities to introduce the 
necessary cuts in expenses or the households to recon-
struct their savings as it was easy to pay off loans. 
All these phenomena were accelerated owing to the 
progressing liberalisation of capital flows; however, it 
diverged a little from the model assumptions. First of 
all, it was adopted that the advisability of the opening 
of capital markets on a global scale resulted from the 
legitimacy of material resources markets and goods 
market.  As  liberalisation  and  deregulation  of  prod-
uct flow is beneficial for countries deciding to imple-
ment them, liberalisation and deregulation of capital 
flow must also turn out to be useful. Thus, the capital 
is treated as “goods” in this case, while the free trade 
theory constitutes the intellectual basis for it. 
In accordance with the neoclassical trade theory, the 
free flow of goods on a global scale, which means por-
tability of production factors embodied in products, re-
lieves the effects of incomplete mobility of these goods 
in the international system. If the free trade condition 
is met, the specialisation is based on relatively abun-
dant resources results in a tendency to level out relative 
prices of manufacturing factors and goods on a global 
scale  (the  Ohlin-Heckscher-Samuelson  theorem). 
An increase in foreign demand for a product requir-
ing considerable expenditure of the abundant factor 
increases both the demand for services of this factor, 
raising its domestic remuneration, i.e. the price. There-
fore, the international exchange causes an increase in 
the prices of the abundant factor and a decrease in the 
prices of the rare factor, which is why the income of the 
owners of the abundant factor increases and the situa-
tion is the opposite for the rare factor. 
The  application  of  this  reasoning  to  the  contem-
porary globalisation of capital flow makes it possible 
to decide that the tendency to level out the relations 
between the prices on an international scale receives 
another stimulus from the free transfer of the capi-
tal from countries, where it is abundant to countries 
suffering from capital deficiency (and therefore, less 10 W. Jakóbik
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developed).  In  the  latter,  the  capital,  as  a  specific 
production  factor  is  characterised  by  a  higher  final 
productivity  and,  so,  altogether  the  world  allocates 
its resources in a more effective way and ensures the 
optimal risk distribution, which results in a more in-
tense economic growth. A conviction arose that free 
financial flows should bring visible effects, especially 
for countries poor in capital and, therefore, affected by 
excessive fluctuation of the increase in gross national 
income and, as a result, consumption. This brings the 
following remarks:  
Firstly, certain “technical” assumptions of the neo-
classical approach should be regarded as anachronous 
in the light of the theoretical progress: homogeneity 
of the flowing capital (lack of distinction between the 
short-term and long-term capital), stability of this ap-
proach consisting in the analysis of the existing bilat-
eral relations between countries, and, finally, the effec-
tiveness of the markets and informational asymmetry 
(the latter is particularly criticised by Stiglitz).
Secondly, numerous economists raises doubts about 
financial globalisation as regards broadly understood 
effectiveness  of  capital  allocation,  especially  benefi-
cial distribution of risk and stabilisation (Greenwald 
& Stiglitz, 2006; Reisen & Soto, 2001). What is more, 
Lucas  (1990)  paid  attention  to  the  fact  that  capital 
flows  mostly  between  highly  developed  countries 
and, later on, it turned out that against the neoclassi-
cal ideas - the capital is mostly transferred from less 
to more developed countries. In the years 1996-2006, 
the net outflow of capital from developing countries 
and countries during system transformation kept in-
creasing, although the tendency was less visible in the 
latter. At the beginning of the new century, a group of 
countries with capital surplus was established, led by 
China.  Paradoxically,  as  against  the  assumptions  of 
the mainstream economy, the liberalisation of capital 
flow accelerated and caused the acquisition of funds 
to cover the deficit in the balance of payments easier, 
which was actually a huge step towards the economic 
breakdown. 
 Under conditions of erroneous deregulation and 
progressing liberalisation with the simultaneous lack of 
supervision and control, the so-called financialisation 
of the economy occurred - especially the American 
economy, which is to be understood as the strengthen-
ing of the role of the financial motivation, entities and 
financial markets both domestically and internation-
ally. An increase in the share of the financial sector in 
the GDP occurred and at the same time, the financial 
market became autonomous towards the real zone by 
enhancing the risk level by financial engineering. The 
basis of its development was the assumption concern-
ing the growing trend of variables, such as indices, as-
set valuation, GDP and, in this way, also the demand 
and constant inflow of money, which altogether accel-
erated the speculative turnover. 
2. Neoliberalism in the theoretical di-
mension
The neoliberal doctrine, encompassing specific ideas 
and  notions  about  the  economy,  could  become  the 
original cause of the crisis only because of the fact 
that it was developed by tools of neoclassical economy, 
which has been criticised for years (it is worth remem-
bering that also other, newer directions are included in 
the mainstream, such as behavioural economics, new 
institutional economics, experimental economics, etc. 
which not evoke sharp criticism). In general, the fol-
lowing main areas of criticism can be identified (Woj-
tyna, 2008: 12-13).
The first one stresses the weaknesses of economics 
as  an  instrument  of  scientific  recognition,  claiming 
that  it  is  a  “false”  science  preventing  better  under-
standing of economic society. As positive economics, 
it fails in the role of a tool, which explains facts and 
tendencies, which have already occurred, but also as 
a tool predicting upcoming events, especially the ones, 
which are important regionally or globally. Also, neo-
classical economics viewed from the normative angle 
is assessed negatively. In this case, its excessive con-
centration on the problems of goods and money, and 
there is too little interest in the redistribution of wealth 
or ecology or the morality of people involved in the 
economic system.
Another area of criticism concerns the inadequacy 
of research methods: neoclassical economics (which 
continues to be called mainstream economics with the 
reservations submitted) is too theoretical and becomes 
similar to intellectual games, which do not lead to solv-
ing practical problems. Disputes revolve around the 
question whether economics should draw from meth-
ods typical of humanities or of natural sciences based 
on the application of mathematics. The superiority of Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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the latter would consist in, among other things, at least 
limiting the role of ideologies and political views of re-
searchers who construct economic models. 
The  third  area  encompasses  critical  remarks  ad-
dressed  to  the  scope  of  research  conducted  within 
neoclassical economics: its opponents stress the lack 
of  knowledge  about  social  economic  mechanisms 
among its opponents (e.g. they think it is unaccept-
able  to  treat  individual  and  group/social  rationality 
as one). Another weakness of mainstream research is 
its excessive interest in horizontal informational and 
regulatory connections at the expense of vertical con-
nections, which causes the research to shed little light 
on the role of a modern state in the economy under 
competitive pressure from its international environ-
ment. And all this is based on the dubious assump-
tion about the homeostatic striving of the economy for 
general equilibrium, which, in turn, encouraged Solow 
to define the neoclassical world as a triad of “greed-
rationality-balance”. 
It will not be a mistake to state that actually all of the 
areas of criticism, which have been discussed here are 
brought in the discussion between economists in con-
nection with the role of science in the context of crisis. 
However, its intensity seems to be greater than usual. 
Although the authorities taking part in the discussion 
(such as Krugman, Stiglitz, Cochrane, Colander) ex-
press different opinions about the immediate causes of 
the breakdown and ways of repair, they all believe that 
economic sciences in their orthodox form are facing 
an unprecedented challenge now. It is not attempted to 
present reservations concerning mainstream econom-
ics; however, they can be summarised briefly (Colan-
der, Goldberg, Haas et al., 2009; Hardt, 2010). 
Firstly, it is observed that economists attempt to build 
a universal theory which is at the same time stunning as 
far as its scientific elegance is concerned. The success of 
economy in the role of a so-called “hard” social science 
has made its proponents treat the mainstream research 
as a model, in which instruments and results are to be 
distributed in areas, which used to be outside the scope 
of economy, such as law, sociology or political sciences. 
This process consisting in taking over research areas of 
other social sciences, was dubbed “economic imperial-
ism” in a somewhat mischievous way. A search on the 
source causes of this status quo should focus on the 
internal consolidation of mainstream research around 
the Post Walrasian theory of general equilibrium and 
the strength of this consolidation is illustrated by an 
attempt to devise microbases for macroeconomic the-
ories: neoclassical stability of preferences, full rational-
ity of individuals and market equilibrium. 
Secondly, weak relations with reality or even a lack 
of reality of numerous assumptions lying at the base of 
neoclassical models. It is commonly assumed that mar-
kets operate simply because some conditions for their 
operation are met, but, generally, nobody is interested 
how  they operate, and, first of all how they evolve. The 
central question concerns the prices and technology 
in the function of the allocation mechanism of rare 
resources in the economy. Little attention is devoted 
to the state, and even if attention is paid to the state, 
it happens so only with the assumption of its autono-
mous position towards other entities, while a company 
has a “black box” status reached by resources, which 
are then transformed and launched as products. Noth-
ing is known, on the other hand, about the compli-
cated  process  of  organisation  and  decision-making 
within a corporation. An individual entity capable of 
determining  constant  preferences,  striving  to  maxi-
mise the usefulness and competing for rare resources 
is the great master of all these market events. Little 
wonder that it takes fully rational decisions since it has 
got easy access to free information in a transparent and 
perfect market. Furthermore, there is no uncertainty 
here, since the entity does not enter into complex in-
teractions with other entities - the social environment 
is disregarded in the model. At the same time, this is 
a sign of cognitive reductionism: all concepts referring 
to the macrozone are reduced to the knowledge about 
the microzone (e.g. large groups of consumers behave 
like an individual entity).
To fully present the lack of realism in the neoclas-
sical economics, it is worth recalling its contemporary 
vision of capital flow in the global economy. Leaving 
aside the issues already mentioned above, the competi-
tive fight of individual countries for the nomadic capi-
tal in the open market by means of macroeconomic 
modernisation is in the form of reducing interest rates, 
reducing budget deficits or administrative costs. Main-
stream researchers do not notice the fact that the con-
temporary capital market is highly imperfect due to 
the activity of national states within integration groups 
with  a  considerable  degree  of  institutionalisation, 12 W. Jakóbik
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within which rules of fight and cooperation apply dif-
ferently from neoclassical ones. The majority of them 
are a common achievement of previously negotiating 
members of such a group.
An overview of opinions also shows a negative ap-
proach to the criticism of non-realistic assumptions 
lying at the base of neoclassical models. Hardt (2010, 
pp.  12-15)  refers  to  the  known  Friedman  theorem 
that the lack of realism in the assumptions concern-
ing a given theory should not be a matter of concern 
for the theory itself, and, next, he supports this thesis 
using Solow’s opinion: the complexity of reality neces-
sitates the construction of simplified models. Compil-
ing both of these positions, Hardt develops his own 
thought, which, however, takes a winding path, name-
ly, that there does not exist an objective and aggregate 
measure accounting for the strength of the theory of 
economics. In consequence, the selection of defined 
assumptions  of  a  model  should  be  the  researcher’s 
pragmatic work, depending, for example, on the de-
gree of precision, which they want to achieve for the 
explanation of a given fragment of reality. Hence, the 
conclusion about illegitimate comparison and evalua-
tion of various economic models arises. However, one 
gets the impression that Hardt’s digressions of being so 
general as they are a bit removed from the basic criti-
cism  of  neoclassical  economics,  leaving  out,  among 
other  things,  the  issues  of  cognitive  reductionism 
and the lack of interaction between agents, which are 
of fundamental importance for macroeconomics. In 
other words, the aforementioned author does not de-
fine the borderlines, which should not be crossed while 
designing simplifying assumptions in models. 
Thirdly, criticism towards excessive use of mathemat-
ical tools appears in the literature in connection with 
mainstream researchers striving for formal elegance of 
models, which can also be called an excess of ambition 
compared to the contents of research. The aforemen-
tioned criticism takes two forms: sharp and mild. In 
the  first  case,  critics  talk  about  confusion  between 
“mathematical beauty” and the objective truth. It is not 
surprising, if one analyses Lawson’s statement  (2009, 
p.  765),  who  perceives  the  economy  as  a  naturally 
closed set consisting of isolated elements, which pre-
vents  deductive,  mathematical  modelling.  However, 
this observation is true only as regards certain group of 
models connected with Arrow-Debreu general equi-
librium theory. It was based on twelve simplifying as-
sumptions, among which the most important are those 
concerning the static and stationary character of the 
economy (a set of elements that are constant in time). 
However, if one considers other models, for example, 
the ones created within the framework of the game 
theory, they do not require such rigorous assumptions. 
This is just a step away from the mild form of criticism, 
in the light of which neoclassical researcher should 
strive for extending the mathematical tool so that it 
is possible to model various imperfections of markets 
and complex interactions of their agents. Such a proce-
dure might make the mainstream economics closer to 
the trend of beneficial symbiosis of the technique with 
the contents of the research. 
3. Towards a new paradigm
Hardt’s conclusion about the impossibility of compar-
ing and evaluating various economic models quoted 
above seems to confirm the lack of objective determi-
nants of progress in economics. However, the case is 
not hopeless, the opinion that the following criteria 
determine the maturity of a theory predominates in 
the literature: 
a)  explaining  social  and  economic  phenomena  in 
a way, which is convincing for the majority of re-
searchers; 
b)  formulating possibly accurate forecasts; 
c)  creating  theoretical  bases  for  effective  economic 
policy. If economics is to meet, in particular, the 
last criterion, it should undoubtedly be based  on 
empirical research and progressing theory that re-
quires also perfecting empirical research. 
The increasing willingness among economists in recent 
years to face these criteria results in increased diversity 
and pluralism of tasks. These two notions are not iden-
tical as the pluralism of the theory concerns the judge-
mental evaluation of the situation in the area of theoreti-
cal diversity (Mäki, 1997, p. 39). In short, pluralism exists 
if there exists a positive evaluation of theoretical diversity, 
which enriches the cognitive possibilities of economics. 
However, a situation in which, despite the diversity of the 
theory, the pluralism is limited, as the conviction about 
the harmfulness of the diversification of studies predomi-
nates among numerous researchers - this was the case in 
the 1970s, when the opinion of intellectual perfection of 
the general equilibrium theory became consolidated.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
13 Theory of Economy as the Original Cause of the World Crisis
In the course of time, it became clear that it was not 
possible to continue a theory, which disregards consti-
tutive features of the contemporary economy. Uncer-
tainty, expensive information, imperfect markets, re-
newable imbalance, arriving wave on innovation, etc. 
Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s, a significant 
increase in both diversity and pluralism in the theory 
of economy was observed. Mainstream research be-
came  divided  into  numerous  approaches  (e.g.,  the 
game  theory  or  the  chaos  and  complexity  theory), 
however, assumptions referring to the limited ratio-
nality and to institutions regulating the behaviour of 
individual entities appeared in the new models, apart 
from unshakeable neoclassical assumptions. Particular 
attention was paid to the relations between economy 
and psychology, which made it possible to create be-
havioural economy (Bruni & Sugden, 2007). 
In general, it is a symbiotic relationship between 
economy and psychology, which makes it possible to 
analyse market phenomena in a situation, in which 
the  behaviour  of  entities  in  the  market  arise  under 
the influence of some limitations or complications. In 
other words, this relationship increases the interpreta-
tive ability of economics, thanks to the assimilation of 
more realistic psychological attitudes. At present, be-
havioural economics is considered to be a fully fledged 
field of research, not only because it has undermined 
the neoclassical conviction about standard (rational) 
behaviour,  but  also  due  to  the  fact  that  formalised 
models  have  been  developed,  which  are  capable  of 
accounting for non-standard behaviour and their im-
portance for market operation. The future of this eco-
nomics is seen among unified behavioural sciences in-
cluding, apart from economics, anthropology, biology, 
psychology, sociology, political science and the general 
theory of evolution should be perceived as their centre 
of gravity. 
Just like any other field of research, also behavioural 
economics has its strengths and weaknesses. The first 
of these, undoubtedly, include a broad use of results 
of experimental research, in the light of which, a new 
variable, ignored in the standard economic model, is 
important for explaining a fragment of reality (how-
ever, all experimental variables can be defined under 
actual  economic  conditions).  In  other  words,  the 
strength of behavioural economics lies in its contribu-
tion to the increase in the realism of economic models, 
and, in this way, also its application value. The lack of 
a general theory creating a common framework for 
individual  fields  of  studies  constitutes  its  weakness, 
which makes it more difficult to move towards a new 
paradigm. 
Contemporary  economy  is  also  characterised  by 
relationships  with  sociology;  however,  in  this  case, 
we deal only with the imperialism of economic sci-
ence,  i.e. their entering areas of research, which used 
to  be  explored  only  by  sociologists.  The  extension 
of the scope of analyses means the appearance of an 
economic  theory  of  marriage  and  reproductiveness, 
as well as a theory of social capital, segregation and 
discrimination, social networks and collective actions 
(Becker, 1990). However, undertaking social dilemmas 
is not accompanied by a search for a new method, as 
a traditional economic approach to all human behav-
iour occurring under conditions of rare resources and 
competitive objectives. This approach is based on three 
neoclassical pillars: fully rational, maximising human 
behaviour, stability of preferences and market equi-
librium (economic sociology applying its own tools 
to interpret social relations, which are a constitutive 
market element, is a separate case not covered by this 
analysis). 
New institutional economics deserves our attention 
among various research approaches, as it focuses on 
the role of institutions in the reduction of transaction-
al costs and uncertainty in economic processes (Fu-
rubotn & Richter, 2000). This approach has its roots 
in neoclassical economics; however, it is characterised 
by  an  assumption  concerning  limited  rationality  of 
market entities, which is the decisive factor in the pos-
sibility of transactions costs amounting to zero. Factors 
limiting human rationality and are, at the same time, 
a source of transactional costs are imminent in the 
market mechanism: incomplete knowledge, informa-
tional asymmetry and uncertainty characterising the 
behaviour of other market participants. Representa-
tives of new institutional economics think that insti-
tutions (the frames) and organisations (the forms) of 
collective operation should be analysed as recognition 
of certain regularities can probably weaken (but not 
eliminate) the aforementioned factors. 
Undoubtedly,  new  institutional  economics  un-
dertakes the difficult task of answering current ques-
tions, which were ignored by neoclassical (orthodox) 14 W. Jakóbik
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economics, leading to greater realism of economic re-
search. The basic question concerns the actual mecha-
nism of making decisions by people and explaining 
how individual decisions are transformed into the be-
haviour of markets and societies. Contemporary insti-
tutional economics creates a description of collective 
action of human entities, coordinated by institutional 
rules of the game and observed from the perspective of 
a company, state or a group of interests. However, from 
the  point  of  view  of  research  methodology,  institu-
tional economics is disappointing as it has not created 
a new analytical tool, which would be different from 
the orthodox one. Using tools of neoclassical econom-
ics and its deductive discipline, new institutionalism 
attempts to account for the operation and evolution of 
institutions in order to extend the scope of microeco-
nomics and to increase its predictive power. 
Conclusions
A comparative analysis of approaches to relations be-
tween the theory of economy and the economic devel-
opment has shown the superiority of the historical ap-
proach, according to which causes of the contemporary 
crisis are much deeper than technical ones. Neoliberal 
ideology  and  the  mainstream  economics  connected 
with it lie at the base of the crisis as they provided fuel 
for erroneous institutional policy initiating secondary 
causes of global breakdown, such as underdevelopment 
of global institutions and liberalisation of capital flow. 
Furthermore, the analysis of structure of dependency 
between these causes has proved that no crisis event 
was an accident, but a well thought-out effect of mu-
tual, and sometimes cumulative, interactions between 
the aforementioned causes (the American economy, 
in which interaction between erroneous deregulation, 
quantitative loosening of monetary policy and global 
imbalance occurred, can be an example here).
The criticism of mainstream economics presented 
in the literature (for a long time) supported by the dis-
honourable role of this economics in the development 
and explosion of the crisis could signal the twilight of 
the traditional paradigm and the birth of a new one. 
This conclusion is partially right as despite the growing 
diversification and pluralism of research, it is easier to 
obtain a positive assessment of new ideas and research 
areas than a new methodology. Actually, apart from 
behavioural economics, none of the remaining inno-
vative trends have not contributed in a significant way 
to the development of a new paradigm. Therefore, the 
situation of economics seems complex, increasing real-
ism of the developed models will be certainly accom-
panied by a long-lasting process of modernisation of 
research methodology, which makes it possible to look 
into the future with moderate optimism, especially as 
regards the application value of economic theories. 
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